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INTRODUCTION 
 
Behavioral finance starts from a 
psychological field highlighting that an 
individual cannot make a decision without 
his/her psychological condition influence, and 
that individual is assumed to have limited 
rationality (Shefrin, 2001). Many empirical 
studies related to financial-based-psychology 
emerge later confirming doubt on the 
traditional financial concept and doubt on 
theories underlying the traditional finance like 
the efficient market hypothesis (Baker, 
Ruback, & Wurgler, 2004). 
One of the most intensively discussed 
topic in behavioral financial studies is the 
overconfidence (KDB) behavior in corporate 
strategic decision. Literatures in the field of 
psychology report that individuals basically 
have the same characteristics, in which they 
tend to be overconfident and optimistic 
(Hackbarth, 2008). Individuals will be deemed 
to be overconfident when they believe that 
any information and capabilities they have 
are sufficient to predict future, and 
consequently believe that any decision they 
make now may pose positive results in the 
future. The results of experimental 
researches conducted by Kruger (1999), 
Svenson (1981) state that individuals with 
positive characters will perceive themselves 
“above average”.  
In corporate context, manager is individual 
exposed the most to bias like KDB (Li and 
Tang, 2010). There are some reasons that 
corporate manager bear KDB. First, an 
individual will be very confident when he/she 
perceives that he/she has a strong control 
over outcome (Langer, 1985). Second, an 
individual will also be susceptible to the 
tendency to judge or predict an outcome too 
high (overestimate) when he/she is highly 
committed to its achievement (Weinstein, 
1980). Third, an individual will overestimate 
his/her own ability when he/she hardly find 
any direct comparison of a decision he/she 
makes. The consequences of this bias are to 
have a high level of loss aversion, to perceive 
that the company he/she leads is in 
undervalued condition, to tend to make 
overinvestment using internal fund, or to 
prefer debt to equity (Ben-David, Graham & 
Harvey, 2007; Shefrin, 2001). 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
In the scope of behavioral finance, a CEO 
with managerial bias perceives that his 
decision making will maximize company 
value, although the opposite actually takes 
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This research aims at testing the influence of CEO’s overconfidence (KDB) on the values 
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place (Baker et al, 2004). In research 
domain, economic losses suffered by 
company because of managerial bias remain 
unclearly quantified (Baker et al, 2004; 
Fairchild, 2009). Similarly, no many empirical 
results have proven the effects of CEO’s KDB 
on company value, but only few researches 
have tested both variables. 
Gervais and Goldstein (2004) and 
Fairchild (2009) are of the opinion that CEO’s 
KDB may drive company productivity. 
However, models tested by other researchers 
show that CEO’s irrational behavior causes 
overinvestment which lead to reduction of 
marginal value created by the investment, 
and the tendency of CEO funding investment 
using debt, leading to company’s distress 
cost (Hackbarth, 2009; Heaton, 2002; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2005a).  
The research therefore is of the opinion 
that this bias will influence the quality of 
manager’s decision in relation to corporate 
policy. Therefore, further test is necessary to 
examine whether this bias benefits or 
damage company instead. Managerial bias 
like KDB may influence corporate policy, 
including funding decision, investment 
decision and dividend decision which will 
eventually influence company’s performance. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b) and 
Malmendier et al. (2011) test the influence of 
managerial bias on corporate policy. They 
find that manager with KDB will show three 
tendencies: first, overinvestment; second, 
tendency to perform merger and acquisition 
which do not give added value to company; 
and, third, tendency to use debt instead of 
issuing capital. 
Ben-David et al. (2007) test the influence 
of CEO,s overconfidence on corporate policy 
using survey. They find that company led by 
manager with high level of confidence will 
have high investment level, often perform 
acquisition, have high rate of debt, 
infrequently distribute dividend and prefer 
share repurchase.  
Campbell et al. (2011) test the influence of 
managerial trait on company owner’s 
prosperity, and this research is the first one to 
test the relationship of both. They test the 
model formulated by Goel and Thakor (2008), 
in which the model predicts that manager 
with moderate-level overconfidence will more 
optimally maximize company performance 
which will eventually lead to company 
owner’s prosperity. This takes place since 
manager with normal confidence tends to 
appropriately catch information, without 
exaggerating or reducing the quality of 
information he/she has. This research result 
is consistent with the research conducted by 
Hackbarth (2008) predicting that managerial 
bias will remain posing positive impacts on 
shareholders as long as it remains at normal 
or moderate level. 
Campbell et al. (2011) in their research 
test and prove a statement that manager with 
overconfidence will be likely to be dismissed 
from his/her job, since such a manager often 
exaggerates the quality of any information, 
which lead to overinvestment and may 
eventually devastate company value. 
Manager too low confidence will also tend to 
highly doubtful which may lead to his/her 
dismissal since he/she tend to make 
underinvestment which eventually lead to 
company’s slowed down productivity. 
Manager deemed to improve company value 
is one with moderate level of confidence. This 
argument is consistent to the research 
conducted by Heaton (2002), Goel and 
Thakor (2008), and Hackbarth (2008). 
The research considers that CEO’s 
confidence is trade-off with benefits it brings 
out to influence company value. Therefore, 
this research will prove the impacts of CEO’s 
KDB on company value. 
The problem of this research is to 
examine whether there is negative impacts of 
CEO’s too low KDB and CEO’s KDB on 
company value in comparison to moderate 
confidence. The purpose of this research is to 
test that CEO’s too low KDB and CEO’s too 
high KDB will pose negative impact on 
company in comparison to moderate 
confidence. 
 
H1: CEO’s KDB positively affects the 
company value. 
 
METHODS  
 
The population of this research is all stocks of 
companies which go-public and are 
registered with the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange during the research period, from 
2007-2015. This research takes all 
companies included in the defined criteria as 
its samples. 
The proxy of company value is Tobin’s Q 
in accordance with Malmendier and Tate’s 
model (2005). Tobin’s Q is defined as asset 
market value divided by asset book value. 
Asset market value is obtained from total 
assets plus equity market value reduced by 
equity book value. Equity market value is 
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total outstanding stocks multiplied by stock 
price at the end of year and equity book value 
is Total equity reduced by total preferred 
stock plus deferred tax (balance sheet) 
This research’s free variable has two 
CEO’s KDB proxies to be used, which are 
one developed by Richardson (2006), and 
one used by Scrand and Zechman (2012). 
The proxies will be treated in separate 
interaction with company value as an attempt 
to test the robustnessof CEO's KDB proxies. 
The proxy modeled by Richardson (2006) 
is used to view the investment level of a 
company in line with KDB measurement in 
this research. This is appropriate to the 
research conducted by Malmendier and Tate 
(2005) and Campbell et al (2011) stating that 
there is relationship between CEO’s KDB and 
investment decision, theoretically or 
empirically. Therefore, we may make a 
simple conclusion that company’s investment 
level contains information related to CEO’s 
KDB.  
The Richardson’s model (2006) is as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 ……………………………………(1) 
 
In which,  
INEW, t  = (Capext+ Acquisitiont+    
 R&D Expensest -Sales   
 ofPPEt)- (Depreciation   
 &amortizationt) 
Growth = Tobin’s Q (market value/ 
book value of equity) 
Lev = Ratio of total debt to total  
assets 
Cash = ln (cash + short-term  
 investment) 
Size = ln (total assets) 
INEW,t-1 = INEW, t in the previous year 
Industry, year = Dummy industry and year 
 
From the regression model above, 
residual value will be obtained from each 
sample. Consistently to Richardson’s (2006), 
sample companies which generate positive 
residue will be classified into overinvestment 
companies, while company samples with 
negative residue will be classified into 
underinvestment companies. Companies in 
overinvestmentcategory will be scored 1, 
assuming that they have CEO with KDB, 
while companies in underinvestment category 
will be scored 0. 
According to Schrand and Zechman 
(2012), there are two indicators of KDBat 
firm-level related to investment decision and 
funding decision made by company, proven 
by previous empirical researches. Schrand 
and Zechman (2012) assume that if both 
indicators are fulfilled, a company will be 
assumed to have CEO with KDB. Therefore, 
KDB will be scored 1, and KDB will be scored 
0 if both indicators are not fulfilled.  
The first KDB component is industry-
adjusted excess investment (EXINVEST). 
This variable is measured using company’s 
capital expenditure. A company will be stated 
to have CEO with KDB if its EXINVEST is 
above median industry for two consecutive 
years. If company’s EXINVEST is above 
median industry, the EXINVEST will be 
categorized 1, and 0 to the contrary. Score 1 
indicates that a company has high KDB 
(High_KDB) and score 0 indicates low KDB 
(Low_KDB). 
The second KDB component is firm’s 
industry-adjusted debt-to-equity ratio 
(DERATIO). Heaton (2002) present a 
research result that CEO with KDB tends to 
follow pecking order theory. This result is 
consistent with the result of research 
conducted by Hackbarth (2008). A DER 
higher than median industry may illustrate 
CEO’s overconfidence (Malmendieret al., 
2011; Ben-David et al., 2007). DERATIO will 
be scored 1 if company’s DER ratio is above 
median industry. Score 1 indicates that a 
Table 1. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Dev. St. Min Max 
Q 265 1.421 1.478 0.003 6.202 
KDB 327 0.1000 0.3000 0 1 
LOW_KDB 327 0.052 0.223 0 1 
HIGH_KDB 325 0.468 0.499 0 1 
SIZE 262 7.399 1.589 3.857 11.632 
PROF 292 0.132 0.103 -2.318 0.894 
LEV 271 0.211 0.189 -0.627 0.286 
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company have high KDB (High_KDB) and 
score 0 indicates low KDB (Low_KDB). 
The control variables employed in this 
research constitute ones deemed to have 
separate impact on company value, 
Company size (SIZE), which in this 
research is measured using natural logarithm 
of company’s total assets. These variables 
are expected to be negatively connected with 
dependent variables. 
Profitability (PROF), which is the 
comparison between operating profit and 
total assets, expected to positively influence 
company value. 
Leverage (LEV), which is total long-term 
debt compared with total equity, expected to 
negatively influence company value. 
The model employed to test hypothesis 1 
is logistic regression. The data constitute 
panel data. The model employed to test 
hypothesis 1 is as followed: 
 
…………………………………………………….…(2) 
 
In which,  
Qit = Tobin,s Q 
KDBit = Dummy variable CEO,s 
KDB obtained from 
overinvestment proxy, 
scored 1 if company is of 
overinvestment category, 
and scored 0 to the 
contrary. 
Xhit =Control variables SIZE,  
PROF, LEV 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
A summary of variables employed in this 
research is given in table 1. This research’s 
data are unbalanced panelobtained from 
2007-2015. We may examine that the 
observations of each variable show different 
number since the researcher consciously 
adjust data deemed to cause statistical bias 
as the result of outlier data. Table 2 informs 
the relationship of CEO’s KDB with company 
value proxied by Tobin’s Q. No control 
variable is in interaction in the initial two 
models. We may observe that both models 
support the hypothesis presented in this 
research. CEO’s KDB poses positive impact 
on company value and too low KDB and too 
high KDB pose negative impact on company 
value. Model 3 to model 5 include all control 
variables deemed to influence company 
value. With existing control variables, we 
expect to ensure that KDB’s impact on 
company value is not influenced by any other 
variable which may lead to biased result. 
KDB variable generates consistent value in 
models 3 and 5, positively and significantly 
on company value, both in interaction with 
control variables and when model 5 is in 
interaction with KDB’s variables. In LowKDB 
and High KDB variables, the results 
presented by models 4 and 5 are also 
consistent with that of model 2. Both low and 
high KDBs show negative value on company 
value. The one difference is only the 
significance level of LOW_KDB variable at 
alpha 0.1.  
The results shown by all control variables 
are as what the researcher has expected. 
Company size negatively and significantly 
 
Table 2. 
CEO’s KDB and Company Value 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
KDB 0.415***  0.346***  0.324*** 
 (8.06)  (8.01)  (2.45) 
LOW_KDB  -0.152*  -0.014* -0.06* 
  (-1.71)  (-0.16) (-1.35) 
HIGH_KDB  -0.376***  -0.220*** -2.61*** 
  (-6.55)  (-6.03) (-9.26) 
SIZE   -0.118*** -0.198*** -0.088*** 
   (-5.65) (-4.30) (-3.55) 
PROF   5.89*** 5.234*** 5.505*** 
   (12.91) (12.18) (13.51) 
LEV   -2.209*** 0.297* -0.370*** 
   (-1.14) (-4.14) (-2.32) 
Constant 1.515*** 1.588*** 1.597*** 1.675*** 1.609*** 
 (42.17) (41.21) (11.23) (9.65) (9.9) 
Adj R
2
 0.20 0.22 0.27 0.28 -.28 
Observation 2255 2255 2254 2255 2255 
t statistics in parentheses *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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influences company value. Company’s big 
size is identical to company’s maturity level, 
which means that big company is deemed to 
be mature, and its life cycle is deemed to be 
lower than that of developing or growing 
company, since a mature company is 
assumed not to have reinvestment 
opportunity (depleted). The profitability 
variable positively influences company value, 
and leverage negatively influences company 
value. The higher the leverage, a company 
will have higher debt cost, higher distress 
risk, higher total debt than its equity). 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
This research aims at testing the influence of 
CEO’s overconfidence (KDB) on company 
value. Companies led by CEO with too high 
or too low KDB evidently have negative 
influence to their company value. CEOs with 
KDB tend to be “overconfident” of their ability 
to predict future, which in this case is future 
investment opportunity. This confidence puts 
a company in overinvestment condition with 
higher cost of debt since CEOs with higher 
KDB tend to prefer debt to equity. The use of 
debt makes company have high leverage 
level. The opposite takes place on CEO with 
too low KDB. Doubt makes existing 
investment opportunity, which should be 
taken by company, no taken which put 
company in underinvestment condition and 
slow down its productivity. 
To test KDB, this research employs two 
proxies of Schrand and Zechman (2012) and 
Richardson (2006) symbolized as KDB1 and 
KDB2. These proxies usage is initially 
intended to test model robustness if two 
different proxies are used. However, some 
inconsistent results are found between both 
proxies during test. Although both proxies 
present the same results for hypothesis test, 
but some variables in some models are not 
the same, among others, significance level 
and mark of variable coefficient. 
Some previous researches state that 
CEOs with KDB will argue that company will 
have future investment opportunity, thus they 
will reduce dividend for internal fund reserve. 
The tests performed in this research are still 
limited to testing that when a company have 
CEO with KDB, there is a tendency that the 
company will distribute dividend lower than 
other companies led by rational CEO. 
However, this research is still unable to 
answer to what extent the future often 
assumed by CEO that the company has 
investment opportunity. It needs to test other 
KDB constructs, since there is no standard 
construct to measure an individual’s 
overconfidence. One model will be found out 
of some tested KDB constructs to measure 
the most robust overconfidence. 
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